BARCELONA, (ESA).- ESA’s proposed Hera mission will already visit two asteroids: the Didymos binary pair. The Hera team hopes to boost that number by performing a flyby of another asteroid during the mission’s three-year flight.

The opportunity arises because Hera will be flying out to match Didymos’ 770-day orbit, which circles from less than 10 million km from Earth to out beyond Mars, at more than double Earth’s distance from the Sun.

In the process Hera will pass both multiple near-Earth asteroids and the inner edge of the main Asteroid Belt. Initial studies at ESA’s European Space Operations Centre have turned up dozens of candidate asteroids across different mission scenarios.

“Ideally we would like a flyby of another binary asteroid, to enable comparisons with Didymos,” explains ESA’s Hera project scientist, Michael Küppers.

“We would choose something of a different taxonomic type from the S-type asteroids like Didymos. We would also prefer a larger object: its greater size would allow us to resolve it meaningfully from further away.”

Take as an example one body researchers would like to see: the 2121 Sevastopol binary pair in the inner belt has an 8.6 km diameter main body with a 3.5 km diameter moon.

This system is a member of the poorly understood ‘Flora’ family of main belt stony asteroids, produced by a collision event a relatively recent 100 million years ago – theorised to be associated with the Chicxulub impact that killed the dinosaurs.

The next step would be to create a shortlist of targets, which could then be the subject of ground-based observations to determine more about their properties and sharpen knowledge of their orbits before Hera’s launch in late 2023.

ESA’s Rosetta comet-chaser performed two asteroid flybys as it passed through the main belt during its decade-long flight to comet 67P/Churyumov–Gerasimenko, passing the 5-km diameter diamond-shaped 2867 Šteins and the mammoth 120-km diameter 21 Lutetia.

“To make flybys happen, we have to know where our trajectory will pass relatively close to asteroids if we do nothing,” notes Michael Khan, heading Mission Analysis at ESA’s Flight Dynamics division. “Then we tweak the trajectory to make a specific difference to that distance, bringing us much closer.

“With Rosetta we had a lot of capability, because it was a large spacecraft with extra fuel in in the tanks to get the mission back on track in case something went wrong. Plus we were performing lots of gravity-assist flybys around Earth and Mars, and massaging those flybys slightly gave us a lot of freedom to manoeuvre.

“Hera is not Rosetta, however: this will be a smaller mission with a shorter cruise phase and lower performance limits. We will still try, but the constraints are such that we won’t know for certain which asteroids we could target until after Hera’s launch. It will come down to what day within Hera’s launch window that we take off, and also the precision of that take-off – it is possible that any extra fuel earmarked for asteroid flybys might be needed to fine-tune our trajectory to Didymos. But any flyby would be an excellent opportunity to boost Hera's science return even further.””

To compare the two missions, Rosetta was lorry-sized, while Hera will be the scale of a desk. But any asteroid flyby would benefit its end mission as well as offering plentiful bonus science.

Michael Küppers was also part of the Rosetta team: “These hours-long asteroid flybys were quite dramatic events, and our opportunity to try out our scientific instruments and obtain scientific results from these unknown objects, preparing for our main goal of 67P/Churyumov–Gerasimenko.”

Hera’s lead scientist Patrick Michel, CNRS Director of Research of France’s Côte d'Azur Observatory, hopes Hera would indeed achieve a flyby: “Any object would be valuable. Each time we’ve encountered a new asteroid we’ve discovered something unexpected.”

Hera, Europe’s contribution to an international planetary defence experiment, is currently under study to be presented for approval by ESA’s Space19+ Council meeting of European space ministers.

http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineering_Technology/Hera/Close_encounters_planning_for_extra_Hera_flyby

BARCELONA, (ESA).- What comes next after silicon? Some seven decades from the invention of the silicon chip this question is often asked, especially in the space sector: demands for extreme high performance have highlighted silicon’s inherent limitations, raising interest in a new range of ‘wide bandgap’ semiconductor materials. 

A material’s ‘bandgap’ is the space between atomic shell layers that dictates the amount of energy needed to get electrons moving and make that material conductive. But electrons can also be shifted into the conduction band by heat; so, for instance, silicon-based semiconductors become unusable for temperatures from around 180°C and up.

Wide bandgap materials such as gallium nitride, silicon carbide and diamond can attain much higher operating temperatures, potentially enabling much higher current density designs running at higher voltages. Electrons also move faster through them, delivering faster device speeds. And as an added benefit they are robust against the effects of radiation – a particular issue in space.

ESA recognised the potential of the wide bandgap realm for space at an early stage, founding the ‘GaN Reliability Enhancement and Technology Transfer Initiative’ (GREAT²) in 2008 for gallium nitride (GaN) microwave devices, at a time when it was used mainly for high-performance LEDs and the lasers of Blu-ray players.

Leading research institutes  were brought together with manufacturers to set up an independent European supply chain to manufacture high-quality GaN radio frequency devices for space applications.

“The promise of these materials makes them highly strategic,” explains Andrew Barnes, heading GREAT². “We need independent European supply chains because if we were totally dependent on a foreign source that became subject to export restrictions then the whole industrial sector would be compromised, along with our competitiveness.”

The initial focus of GREAT² was on GaN-based microwave power transistors and integrated circuits, as building blocks for high-performance solid-state power amplifiers, to bolster the competitiveness of the European telecommunications industry – the single largest and most commercial space sector.

“These same power transistors shall in the near future be offered on the open market after completion of a project funded by ESA’s European Component Initiative, which is the first time we’ve achieved that,” adds Andrew. “Such power transistors are also being investigated for use in the next-decade Galileo Second Generation.

“At the same time we’re in the process of qualifying some of the foundry processes used on a more systematic basis, following European Cooperation for Space Standardization rules. We’re also seeking to develop additional standards in terms of screening and testing and insertion into space systems – this is essential for wider industrial take-up of the technology, and we’re making steady progress.”

GREAT²’s focus has now moved to high voltage power converters and amplifiers for higher frequencies, operating at millimetre wavelength. The Ninth Wide Bandgap Workshop hosted at ESA’s Harwell centre in the UK took stock of the general progress made and looked ahead to the next steps towards the wide bandgap future.

“This includes improving production quality of GaN ‘epitaxy’ – meaning crystal growth – and moving to higher frequency foundry processes for space ready parts, utilizing 100 nanometre gate lengths or lower for GaN,” explains Andrew. Work is also ongoing to test the space radiation robustness of GaN power transistors for DC-DC convertor applications.

“We’ve also worked to boost their general robustness. We found, for instance, that some of the passive components used on GaN monolithic microwave integrated circuit parts weren’t performing so well in radiation testing as expected, and this came down to the legacy of their design, originally these capacitor designs were based on legacy parts built in gallium arsenide. By tuning design parameters, i.e. adjusting the dielectric layer stack, we have now achieved a big improvement.”

Other wide bandgap materials such as diamond are also under investigation, in their own right and also as a ‘substrate’ backing material for GaN devices to give improved thermal performance.

Andrew comments: “Diamond has a similar crystalline structure to GaN, and excellent thermal conductivity properties. The University of Bristol presented work done in integrating GaN with diamond. The result is a fivefold increase in heat dissipation, allowing even higher power densities – diamond is a GaN’s best friend.”

The workshop also peered further into the future, with discussions looking forward to GaN-based optoelectronic devices, diamond-based integrated circuits and electric thrusters and the 3D printing of wide bandgap materials, as a means of revolutionising device manufacturing.

http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineering_Technology/ESA_probing_into_post-silicon_wide_bandgap_landscape

WASHINGTON.- Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five officials aligned with illegitimate former President Nicolas Maduro, who continue to repress democracy and democratic actors in Venezuela and engage in significant corruption and fraud against the people of Venezuela.

This action, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, targets the head of the Venezuelan National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera, and SEBIN’s First Commissioner, Hildemaro Jose Rodriguez Mucura; the Commander of Venezuela’s Directorate General of Military Counter-Intelligence, Ivan Rafael Hernandez Dala; and the Director of the Venezuelan National Police’s Special Actions Force (FAES), Rafael Enrique Bastardo Mendoza. Additionally OFAC designated the illegitimate President of Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), Manuel Salvador Quevedo Fernandez.

“Treasury continues to target officials who have helped the illegitimate Maduro regime repress the Venezuelan people. We are sanctioning officials in charge of Maduro’s security and intelligence apparatus, which has systematically violated human rights and suppressed democracy, including through torture and other brutal use of force,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.

“We are intent on going after those facilitating Maduro’s corruption and predation, including by sanctioning the President of PdVSA and others diverting assets that rightfully belong to the people of Venezuela.”

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these individuals, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50% or more by such individuals, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

U.S. sanctions need not be permanent; sanctions are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior. The United States has made clear that we will consider lifting sanctions for persons designated under E.O. 13692 or E.O. 13850 who take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses, speak out against abuses committed by the government, and combat corruption in Venezuela.

The following five individuals designated today have been determined to be current or former officials of the Government of Venezuela:

Ivan Rafael Hernandez Dala (Hernandez) is the Commander of illegitimate former-President Maduro’s Presidential Guard, or Guardia de Honor Presidencial, a position he was appointed to in January 2014. Additionally, Hernandez is Commander of Venezuela’s Directorate General of Military Counter-Intelligence, or Director General de Contrainteligencia Militar, more commonly known as DGCIM.

The DGCIM, in addition to SEBIN, is responsible for serious human rights abuses and the repression of civil society and the democratic opposition. DGCIM has detained and tortured Venezuelan military members suspected of plotting against the government, and has detained and tortured family members of some of those suspects in order to gain information. Abuses reportedly carried out by the DGCIM and SEBIN include brutal beatings, asphyxiation, cutting soles of feet with razor blades, electric shocks, and death threats. Under his command, DGCIM members have often used excessive force against detainees. Hernandez was promoted to the rank of Major General on July 5, 2018.

Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera (Cristopher) is the Director General of the Venezuelan National Intelligence Service, or Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional, more commonly referenced to as SEBIN. Cristopher replaced Gustavo Gonzalez Lopez, who was designated by OFAC pursuant to E.O. 13692 on March 9, 2015, who occupied that position from March 9, 2015 until October 30, 2018.

Prior to his role with SEBIN, Cristopher was President, with the rank of Director General, of the Centro Estratégico de Seguridad y Protección de la Patria, or Strategic Center of Security and Protection of the Homeland, the Venezuelan government organization responsible for the unification of information related to defense, intelligence, internal order, and external relations. According to an official of the Venezuelan opposition party, Justice First, or Primero Justicia, Cristopher oversees mass torture, mass human rights violations, and mass persecution against those who want democratic change in Venezuela.

Hildemaro Jose Rodriguez Mucura (Mucura) is the First Commissioner of SEBIN. On January 11, 2019, Mucura, along with three other SEBIN officers, detained Interim President of Venezuela and President of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó. Mucura directed the detainment of Guaidó, and was one of 12 SEBIN officials later arrested for their association with Guaidó’s temporary detainment.

Rafael Enrique Bastardo Mendoza (Bastardo) is the Commander of a Venezuelan National Police Unit commonly referred to as the Special Actions Force, or Fuerzas de Acciones Especiales (FAES). Additionally, Bastardo was promoted to the position of Lieutenant Colonel on July 5, 2018, as a member of the Venezuelan National Guard. FAES has been branded as Maduro’s “extermination squad,” known for its brutal methods and masked appearances, carrying out nighttime raids throughout Caracas. Since Guaidó assumed his position as Interim President, FAES has been accused of dozens of extrajudicial killings targeting the opposition. On January 31, 2019, in the middle of Guaidó’s news conference on his economic plans, Guaidó said that FAES were in his home threatening his family.

Manuel Salvador Quevedo Fernandez (Quevedo) is the current President of Venezuelan state-owned oil company, PdVSA, which he has continued to represent even after OFAC designated PdVSA pursuant to E.O. 13850 on January 28, 2019. PdVSA is Venezuela’s primary source of income and foreign currency, and has long been used as a vehicle for significant government corruption.

Government officials and businessmen alike devised schemes to launder billions of dollars stolen and embezzled for their personal gain. Quevedo is also the illegitimate Minister of Petroleum and Mining aligned with former President Maduro, a position he has served in since November 26, 2017. Quevedo previously served in numerous government positions, including as the Minister of Housing and Habitat, and as a Brigadier General and head of Regional Command number 5, located in Greater Caracas.

For information about the methods that Venezuelan senior political figures, their associates, and front persons use to move and hide corrupt proceeds, including how they try to exploit the U.S. financial system and real estate market, please refer to FinCEN’s advisories FIN-2017-A006, “Advisory on Widespread Public Corruption in Venezuela,” and FIN-2017-A003, “Advisory to Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and Professionals.”

Identifying information on the individuals designated today.

ZETA.- Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated an Iran-based entity that organizes international conferences that supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force’s (IRGC-QF’s) efforts to recruit and collect intelligence from foreign attendees, including U.S. persons, and four associated individuals.  OFAC also designated a separate Iran-based entity and five associated individuals involved in the targeting of current and former U.S. government and military personnel as part of a malicious cyber campaign to gain access to and implant malware on their computer systems.

“Treasury is taking action against malicious Iranian cyber actors and covert operations that have targeted Americans at home and overseas as part of our ongoing efforts to counter the Iranian regime’s cyber attacks,” said Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.  “Treasury is sanctioning New Horizon Organization for its support to the IRGC-QF.  New Horizon hosts international conferences that have provided Iranian intelligence officers a platform to recruit and collect damaging information from attendees, while propagating anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial.  We are also sanctioning an Iran-based company that has attempted to install malware to compromise the computers of U.S. personnel.”

OFAC closely coordinated today’s designations with the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has separately released details regarding a law enforcement action it took against a number of the persons designated today.

International Conferences Supporting IRGC-QF Intelligence Operations: New Horizon Organization and Associated Individuals

New Horizon Organization hosts international conferences that serve as a platform for the IRGC-QF to recruit and collect intelligence from attendees. Conference organizers have served as conduits for contact between the IRGC-QF and U.S. persons.  Several New Horizon Organization-sponsored conferences have been held in the past few years in Iraq and Iran, where recruitment and collection efforts were made.  These anti-Western conferences propagate anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories, including Holocaust denial.

OFAC also designated four Iranian individuals affiliated with New Horizon Organization.

Gholamreza Montazami, New Horizon Organization’s founder and Executive Director, and Hamed Ghashghavi, New Horizon Organization's Secretary for International Affairs, have collaborated with IRGC circles to organize regime-sponsored New Horizon Conferences.

Nader Talebzadeh Ordoubadi, New Horizon Organization’s Chairman, and Zeinab Mehanna Talebzadeh, who serves as the Chairman's special assistant, have facilitated New Horizon Conferences.

OFAC designated Iran-based New Horizon Organization pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)

13224 for assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.  The IRGC-QF was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007, for providing material support to a number of terrorist organizations.

Gholamreza Montazami, Nader Talebzadeh Ordoubadi, Zeinab Mehanna Talebzadeh, and Hamed Ghashghavi were designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for acting for or on behalf of New

Horizon Organization.

Malicious Cyber Campaign Targeting U.S. Personnel: Net Peygard Samavat Company and Associated Individuals

Iran-based Net Peygard Samavat Company aka Net Peygard (In Sec) Company and several associated actors were involved in a malicious cyber campaign to gain access to and implant malware on the computer systems of current and former counterintelligence agents.

Behzad Mesri, a Net Peygard Samavat Company corporate officer, was involved in the purchase of multiple servers.  Behzad Mesri previously was designated pursuant to E.O. 13694 on March 23, 2018, for his role in the targeting and attempted extortion of a U.S. media and entertainment company.

Hossein Abbasi, aka Hossein Alavi, acting as a manager of the Net Peygard Samavat Company, provided technical support to an official in the IRGC-Counterintelligence Organization.

Hossein Parvar, a Net Peygard Samavat Company-affiliated actor, has provided a group affiliated with Iran’s Ministry oflntelligence and Security (MOIS) with names, websites, email addresses, and U.S. person data. The MOIS was designated pursuant to E.O.s 13224, 13553, and 13572 on February 16, 2012.

Mojtaba Masoumpour tested malware and gathered information on potential targets and networks for intrusion operations to be carried out by Net Peygard Samavat Company.

Milad Mirzabeygi sent confidential files to Net Peygard Samavat Company senior official Hossein Abbasi.

Mohammad Bagher Shirinkar, aka Mojtaba Tehrani, manager at Net Peygard Samavat Company, has provided technical support to the IRGC-Electronic Warfare and Cyber Defense Organization (EWCD), and directed Net Peygard Samavat Company employees to provide project status reports to senior IRGC-EWCD officials.

OFAC designated Net Peygard Samavat Company and Mohammad Bagher Shirinkar pursuant to E.O. 13606 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-EWCD.

Milad Mirzabeygi was designated pursuant to E.O. 13606 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Net Peygard Samavat Company.

Behzad Mesri, Hossein Abbasi, Hossein Parvar, and [placeholder for one individual] were designated pursuant to E.O. 13606 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Net Peygard Samavat Company.

Sanctions Implications

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals and entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation.  Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the persons designated today pursuant to E.O. 13224 or that are Iranian persons on OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) could be subject to U.S. correspondent account or payable-through sanctions.